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NOTES AND COMMENT
vidual may get no satisfaction. If then the employee wishes to sue
for his wages, shall he sue under the pre-code contract of his em-
ployment. If so, he can only sue for his pre-code wages, but the
code benefits are here too denied him. Then, too, what happens to
the original contract of employment? Is it still a contract, or does
the code supersede and destroy or impair it? It would seem, there-
fore, that whether you allow the individual his right of action for the
code minimum wage under the doctrine of contract, or as a benefi-
ciary to enforce his right corresponding to the duty imposed by the
statute, a recovery by the individual in his own name, is indicated.
Otherwise, the benefits granted to him under the Recovery Act,
while they may be detriments to the recalcitrant employer, to the
employee may be no benefits at all.
It is submitted, that were the codes interpreted, as in some in-
stances they have been, to give the individual his right of action,
that this would be the most direct and simplest method of procedure.
While it is true that the codes have the force of law, it is, neverthe-
less, also true that they were conceived and executed in the nature
of agreements.1 Ordinarily they cannot be both, and yet they are
not clearly and exclusively either. Perhaps, in view of the fact that
this is emergency legislation, which creates distinctly new conditions
and relations among individuals, groups of individuals, and the gov-
ernment, both legal and, in a sense, contractual, a new category may
arise to cover these codes, or "contractual statutes," if you will, with
the following, admittedly strained, but perhaps not totally unreason-
able, interpretation: Codes to be considered as having the attributes
of both legislation and contract, a dual nature, so to speak, in order
to allow the individual his right of action in his own name and for
his own benefit, following doctrines of contract, and at the same time,
enforcing their legal aspect by the methods provided for in the
various sections of the Recovery Act.
WALTER W. PADWE.
THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT IN NEW YORK.
The failure of the National Recovery Administration to enforce
its own laws for the protection of labor 1 has forced the realization
"See President's Special Message, May 17, 1933, recommending passage of
Bill introduced by Sen. Wagner (later to become the N. I. R. A.) : "But the
public interest will be served if, with the authority and guidance of the govern-
ment, private industries are permitted to make agreements and codes insuring
fair competition."
'INT. JuR. AssN. BULL., Vol. 3, No. 2 at 6 (July, 1934); id. Vol. 3, No. 4
at 8 (Sept., 1934) ; id. Vol. 2, No. 9 at 1 (Feb., 1934) ; id. Vol. 2, No. 12 at 11
(May, 1934).
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that with the possible exceptions of lower wages and higher prices,
what labor cannot seize for itself it must forego. And there is a
strange but proper logic in the fact that the practical repeal of the
anti-trust laws has not been considered applicable to labor-for those
laws were never meant to restrain it as they have done; 2 and why
should an administration correct the beneficial errors of its courts?
The New York Court of Appeals has been one of the few to
liberate itself from the outmoded doctrines of conspiracy, malice and
combination so effectual in restraining labor, and to interpret actions
and motives in the light of today's complex industrial scene.3 It did
not find "malice" in the desire of two workingmen to secure better
wages; and it allowed workers to publicize working conditions through
picketing.4 True, courts of the first instance seemed not to consider
the Court of Appeals as authority in industrial matters, 5 but with
amusing regularity, when after a strike had been broken a case
finally reached the highest court, injunction decrees against labor were
either modified or reversed.6
However, in the recent memorandum affirmance of Stuhrner v.
Korman,7 this court has failed to do justice to its reputation. With
Justices Lehman and Crouch dissenting, defendant union was en-
joined from picketing the stores of plaintiff's customers. The Appel-
late Division opinion in affirmance of the court below considered de-
fendant's actions to constitute an illegal secondary boycott. Its deci-
sion was based upon threats of picketing made to plaintiff's customers
(bakeries) if they sold plaintiff's bread and of actual picketing when
compliance was refused. There was no violence unless a "truculent
manner" can be so defined, despite the fact that fifteen hundred
bakeries were picketed for a number of months. The avowed purpose
221 CoNG. REc. 2562, 2606, 2729 (1890), speeches of Senators Teller,
Stewart and Hoar, to the effect that amendments excluding labor were unneces-
sary. Application of the Sherman Act in: United States v. Workingmen's
Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54 Fed. 994 (first application granted) ;
Loew v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908) ; cf. In re Debs, 158
U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900 (1895) ; see BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN AcT.
I FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) at 46.
'Stillwell v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932); Exchange
Bakery v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1926).
' Nathan's Famous, Inc. v. Winter, Sup. Ct. Kings Co., April 24, 1933; see
INT. JR. ASSN. BULL. Vol. 3, No. 1, at 1 (June, 1934); Kronowitz & Latzlo v.
Schlansky, N. Y. L. J., May 22, 1934, Kings Co. Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, Pt. I;
Specialty Bakery Owners of America, Inc. v. Rose, N. Y. L. J., Aug. 30, 1933,
Sup. Ct. Kings Co., Spec. Term., Pt. I.; see Wood Mowing & Reaping Machine
Co. v. Toohey, 114 Misc. 185, 196, 197 (1921) for effect and purpose of such
an injunction.6 J. H. & S. Theatres v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932) and
cases cited; Stillwell v. Kaplan, Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, both supra note
4; Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931) ; Interboro v. Lavin,
247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863 (1928).
%George F. Stuhmer & Co. v. Louis Korman, as Treas. of Bakery & Con-
fectionery Workers Int'l Union of Am., Local 505, et al., 265 N. Y. 39, 191
N. E. - (1934), aff'g, 241 App. Div. 702, 269 N. Y. Supp. 788 (2d Dept.
1934).
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of the picketing was to unionize the plaintiff's factory; the pickets
carried signs stating: "Demand Bread with the International Union
Label." But the opinion stated that the singling out of plaintiff
among a number of non-union bakers was inferential of a design not
to better labor conditions but to destroy plaintiff's business.8
The boycott in labor disputes is a combination of workers to
cease all dealing with another and usually to induce or coerce third
parties to do the same. 9 Its purpose is to force such other to comply
with a demand or to punish him for non-compliance in the past. The
usual distinction between "primary" and "secondary" boycott has been
held to be whether there is merely cessation by concerted action of
dealings with another--or an attempt to procure others to cease deal-
ing as well; 10 and if the procurement is by coercion, the boycott is
called "compound" or "illegal secondary." 11 Here, however, the
court adopts the view of the United States Supreme Court that a
secondary boycott is
" * a combination not merely to refrain from dealing with
complainant, or to advise or by peaceful means persuade com-
plainant's customers to refrain ('primary boycott'), but to
exercise coercive pressure upon such customers, actual or
prospective, in order to cause them to withhold or withdraw
patronage from complainant through fear of loss of damage
to themselves should they deal with it." 12
Though the Appellate Division's short opinion admits that "the
precise question presented by this appeal has never been determined
by the Court of Appeals" the latter has not seen fit to explain its
affirmance. It seems unjustifiable because (1) it is not in accord
with the rationale of its past decisions; (2) it shows no understanding
of the fierceness and inequality of the struggle between what is known
as capital and labor; (3) it shows no right of which defendant has
deprived the plaintiff, or (4) why means used by employers are con-
sidered illegal here; (5) it forecloses the right of free speech.
In Bossert v. Dhity,13 the court refused to enjoin a union from
striking when the employers of its members gave them material made
in plaintiff's non-union mill. The court justified this boycott by an
analogy to National Protective Association v. Cummings 14 where the
8241 App. Div. 702, 269 N. Y. Supp. 788, 789 (2d Dept. 1934).
1LAIDLER, BOYCOTTS AND THE LABOR STRUGGLE (1914) at 64; Butterick
Pub. Co. v. Typo. Wnion No. 6, 50 Misc. 1, 100 N. Y. Supp. 292 (1906).
= OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS (1927) at 606.
U LAIDLER, supra note 9.
Duplex v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 at 466, 41 Sup. Ct. 17, 254 at 47 (1920).2221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917), rezvg, 166 App. Div. 251, 151 N. Y.
Supp. 877 (2d Dept. 1914).i 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902), aff'g, 53 App. Div. 227, 65 N. Y.
Supp. 946 (1st Dept. 1900) ; in accord: Clemmitt v. Watson, 144 Ind. App. 38,
42 N. E. 367 (1895).
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right to strike against (or boycott) non-union co-workers was upheld.
Among the, conditions of employment, says the Bossert opinion, are
not merely those of environment and wages but the union status of
co-workers and of materials.
The Auburn 15 case attempted to distinguish between its facts
and those above. Here defendant unions had employers of their mem-
bers withdraw patronage from plaintiff through fear of labor troubles.
The desire to ruin plaintiff instead of helping themselves and the aim
of putting plaintiff in economic Coventry is the distinction claimed.
In the recent case of Willson & Adams Co. v. Pearce,16 we meet
with either a justification of the difference between this and the
Bossert case as against the Auburn case as resting upon public policy
-or a reversal of the Auburn case. Here, plaintiff, dealers in build-
ing materials, employed non-union drivers and helpers-though their
mills were unionized. Defendant unions called a strike in all building
trades to which defendant through non-union drivers delivered ma-
terials. The strikers were of two types: (1) those required to in-
stall non-union material, and (2) those who merely worked on the
erection of the buildings for which non-union materials were used.
The court found that "defendants were attempting to accomplish
a lawful purpose" * * * "to induce the employment of union team-
sters, chauffeurs and helpers in the transportation of materials and
supplies for use in the erection of buildings in which union men were
employed." 17 It considered the loading and carrying to be a neces-
sary part of the construction of the building and therefore a condition
of defendant's members' employment. Consideration of the Auburn
case is found in this principle:
"that the right to make contracts for the purchase of labor
of others and the sale of one's own labor is subject to the
condition that its exercise in any particular case shall not be
'inconsistent with the public interest or hurtful to the public
order or detrimental to the common good.' " 8
What is it that makes this boycott by picketing illegal and the
Bossert and Willson boycotts legal. The Appellate Division's reason
is that it "constituted a form of interference and coercion of plain-
tiff's customers which compelled their compliance through fear of
loss or damage to themselves." 19
'Auburn v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919); cf. Gill v. Doerr,
214 Fed. 111 (S. D. N. Y. 1914).
'5264 N. Y. 521, 191 N. E. 545, aff'g, 240 App. Div. 718, 178 N. Y. Supp.
713 (2d Dept. 1934); similar conclusion in Reardon v. Caton, 189 App. Div.
501 (2d Dept. 1919); cf. Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 37 Sup.
Ct. 718 (1917).
' 240 App. Div. 718, 265 N. Y. Supp. 624, 625 (2d Dept. 1933).
Is Id. at 719, 265 N. Y. Supp. 624-626.
19 Ibid.
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This court like many others has been frightened by that bogy
word "coercion." Elsewhere has been pointed out what suggestive
effect words like "coercion, intimidation, conspiracy, threats," have
upon decisions. 20 Yet the coercion involved here is neither through
fraud or violence, nor threats thereof; it is only the refusal to trade
and the request to others to do the same. It is but an example of
"the right of an individual or group of individuals to protest in a
peaceable manner against injustice or oppression, actual or merely
fancied * * *." If asking bakeries not to deal with plaintiff is per-,
missible,21 why should not the same be true of asking customers not
to deal with bakeries who by their buying support the plaintiff ? Do
not these bakers aid in the maintenance of objectionable poli-
cies? 22 In both cases there is one purpose: to unionize plaintiff's
shop, an aim considered legal in this state.2 3 The method is the same
-the refusal to buy and the request to others through picketing to
do the same.
If in the Stuhmer case, economic coercion were illegal, then de-
fendants themselves could not refuse to buy from the bakeries, obvi-
ously an absurdity. So, too, if they knew that others might take
notice of their abstention and decide to imitate it. If we agree that
a person may refuse to trade with another with or without reason-
and that his action does not become illegal because others are of the
same mind--can it be that he may not advise his neighbor or friends
not to trade with another-particularly when he gives, as a reason, an
aim recognized in law.24 No one as yet has a property right in the
trade of any particular person in the absence of contract; 25 if he
had, all advertising would be an avenue to legal liability for alienat-
ing the affection of a customer from this or that food product. Even
more anomalous is it to allow direct methods of striking and boy-
cotting against Stuhmer and to give it a right of action because
another has been picketed and boycotted. If a direct injury gives
no right of action, how can we find it in this indirect form?
Boycotts like the one in question are not new in New York. In
' Caldwell, J., dissenting in Hopkins v. Oxley Stove Co., 83 Fed. 912, 924
(C. C. A. 8th, 1897). For holdings that there is an absolute right to threaten
to do what you have a right to do: Nat. Prot. Ass'n v. Cummings, supra note
14; Vegelahn v. Guntner, Holmes, J., dissenting-167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077,
1079 (1890); Ware & De Freville, Ltd. v. Motor Trade Ass'n, 3 K. B. 40
at 69 (1921).
' Foster v. Retail Clerks Protective Ass'n, 39 Misc. 48, 78 N. Y. Supp.
860 (1902); Sinsheimer v. United Garment Workers, 77 Hun 215, 28 N. Y.
Supp. 321 (1894) ; supra note 6.
' Parkinson Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027(1908).
' Nat. Prot. Ass'n v. Cummings, supra note 14; Tallman v. Gaillard, 27
Misc. 114, 57 N. Y. Supp. 419 (1899) ; supra note 6.
"Ulery v. Chicago Live Stock Exchange, 54 Ill. App. 233 (1894).
'Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Fed. of Labor et al., 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac.
127 (1908).
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Spanier Window Cleaning Co. v. Awerkin,26 the Appellate Division,
First Department, modified a Special Term order so as to permit
peaceful picketing of plaintiff's customers' offices, provided no sign
bore the names of plaintiff's customers and their buildings. In
Engelmeyer v. Simon,27 Justice Hammer held that it was not a sec-
ondary boycott to picket places of business of plaintiff's customers
with placards bearing the union label. Likewise in Public Baking
Co. v. Stern,2 8 Proskauer, J., in an opinion affirmed by the First
Department, held that defendant had the right to make a pacific
appeal and use legitimate persuasion in an endeavor to induce plain-
tiff's customers and the ultimate consumer to purchase bread made
by its members. These decisions seem proper in their view that one
can't be intimidated in the sense of unlawful compulsion by being
induced to forego business relations with A rather than lose the bene-
fit of more profitable relations with B and his friend C. They are
supported by the appellate courts of other states.2 9
The unfairness of the Stuhmer decision is manifest when we see
the laxness with which societal groups other than labor are permitted
to use the boycott. In New York, for example, where various mer-
chants combined and induced manufacturers not to allow a rebate
to the plaintiff merchant among others unless he agreed to maintain
standard prices to customers, an injunction was denied. 30 If Local
505 used coercive tactics so did the National Wholesale Druggists
Association. The converse of the instant decision is seen in a Penn-
sylvania decision 31 which held legal an agreement to withdraw patron-
age from wholesalers selling to a contractor who had conceded an
eight-hour day to his employees. Legal, too, have been held actions
of associations whose members refused to buy from those who sold
to non-members; 32 or who declined to bid if a particular individual
or certain groups were allowed to bid.3  And publication of the
225 App. Div. 735 (lst Dept. 1928), memorandum.
' 148 Misc. 621, 265 N. Y. Supp. 636 (1933).
'216 App. Div. 831 (1st Dept., aft'g, 127 Misc. 229, 1926) ; similarly:
Blumenthal and ano. & c. v. Feintuch etc., Spec. Term, Pt I, N. Y. Sup. Ct.,
N. Y. L. J., June 29, 1934, at 3155.
' Infra note 38.
'Park & Sons v. Nat. Wholesale Druggists Ass'n, 175 N. Y. 1, 67 N. E.
136 (1903) ; cf. Straus v. Am. Publishers Ass'n, 177 N. Y. 473, 69 N. E. 1107(1904) limiting this doctrine as result of Laws of 1899, c. 690 re monopolies.
But see Roseneau v. The Empire Circuit Co. et al., 131 App. Div. 429 (4th
Dept. 1909).
Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. 420, 28 Atl. 190 (1894).
Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 55 N. W. 1119 (1893); Brown
v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 43, 41 S. E. 553 (1902); cf. Anderson v.
United States, 171 U. S. 604, 43 Sup. Ct. 300 (1898).
' Master Builders Ass'n v. Domascio, 16 Colo. App. 25, 63 Pac. 782(1901); Glasgow Fleshers Case, 35 S. L. R. 645. Note that this does not
merely present a situation where an association has properly coerced its
members through its rules not to buy from another; here the coercion is upon
a non-member.
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names not merely of those who sold at tabooed prices but of those
who sold to them, together with a request not to buy from or sell to
those on the list have received the approval of the law. An English
case 3 4 sums up the rule applicable to this type of boycott:
"one who procures another to do an act which is not wrongful
so far as that other is concerned can only be made legally re-
sponsible for its consequences if he has procured his object
by the use of illegal means."
In our case, the coercion was the result of the persuasion of the
bakeries' customers. Since they had no contract to buy, the request
was to do a legal act. It is not apparent how the court can justify
the suppression of the right of free speech. The rationalization of
the United States Supreme Court that:
"the unfair list coupled with the agreement to act in concert
has a force not inherent in the words themselves *3* *" 5
simply means that it was successful. An injunction against a boycott
regards as irrelevant the constitutional protection of the right of free
speech:
"Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his
sentiments on all subjects being responsible for the abuse of
that right, and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge
the liberty of speech or the press." 36
The purpose of the section is penalty, not prevention, and other juris-
dictions have held that the ideas of absolute freedom and responsi-
bility therefore cannot co-exist with that of preventing free speech
of any kind.37 Injunctions against similar boycotts have been re-
fused on this ground, in part, in California, Montana and Missouri.3 s
'Ware & De Freville, Ltd. v. Motor Trade Ass'n, 3 K. B. 40 (1921).
' Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 439, 31 Sup. Ct.
492 (1909).
"CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF N. Y., art. I, §8; cf. Stuart v. Press
Publishing Co., 83 App. Div. 467, 477, 82 N. Y. Supp. 401, 408 (1st Dept.
1903). This right is recognized as pre-existing, not merely as created by the
constitutions of the various states. COOLEY, CONST. LIm. (6th ed.) 511 et seq.
'Marx & Haas Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, infra note 38, at 144.
'Marx & Haas Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133, 67 S. W.
391 (1902), that "wherever the authority of injunction begins, there the right
of free seeech, free writing, free publication ends" (at 149) ; City of St.
Louis v. Glover, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S. W. 30 (1908); Parkinson Co. v. Bldg.
Trades Council, supra note 22; Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Fed. of Labor,
supra note 25; Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, Local No. 760, 156 Cal. 70, 103
Pac. 324 (1909) ; cf. Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W.
997 (1908).
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In New York, acts "injurious to society" such as licentiousness or
advocacy of revolution may permit control of the press-but such
control is legislative, not judicial.39 The restraint of publication to
protect property has issued only where there was property in the
publication-as in the case of a private letter.40  Though a libel may
injure one's property 41 and damages therefor be recovered, it will
not be restrained. 42 The instant case gives the New York Constitu-
tion a new ambiguity, for in Stillwell v. Kaplan 43 it was said:
"it has never been held by this court that a labor union is
without justification in fairly setting forth its claims in a con-
troversy over terms and conditions of employment by sign,
handbill or newspaper advertisement as a legitimate means of
economic coercion." (Italics ours.)
Here the defendant union is making this appeal at the best place:
the point of consumption, rather than production.
None of the four cases cited by the Appellate Division are
either controlling or applicable. Duplex v. Deering,44 being a de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court is not the law of New
York; 4 5 it is complicated by the use of the anti-trust laws and the
aura of the conspiracy doctrine. If this and the Auburn 46 case are
applicable, so then is the Willson 47 case which reached a contrary
conclusion. And in the two window cleaning 48 cases cited, in which
injunctions were granted, not only was violence shown, but one ex-
pressly recognized the authority of Spanier v. Awerkin. 9
It seems impossible for a court with a knowledge of trade union
methods to assert that from singling out we must infer a desire to
'People v. John Most, 171 N. Y. 423, 431, 64 N. E. 175, 178 (1902) ; cf.
Ulster Square Dealer v. Fowler, 58 Misc. 325, 11 N. Y. Supp. 16 (1908)
where police officers were restrained from interfering with the circulation of a
paper claimed to be libelous and scurrilous.
40 See 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (14th ed. 1918) p. 627, §1279.
'In the sense currently used: that business is property.
"Brandreth v. Lance, 34 Am. Dec. 368, 8 Paige 330 ((N. Y. 1839) where
the principle of equity's "protecting the rights of property" can be seen
limited by references to Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 403 and STORY, mtpra note
40, to the "private letter" case; for equity's refusal to restrain a libel see Kent.
Ch., in People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 336, 393; Life Ass'n of Am. v.
Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 173; Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384,
64 N. E. 163.
"259 N. Y. 405, 410, 182 N. E. 63 (1932).
" 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 17 (1920).
' Stillwell, supra note 43; Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, supra note 16.
46 Supra note 15.
"Supra note 16.
" Commercial House & Window Cleaning Co. v. Awerkin, 226 App. Div.
734, 233 N. Y. Supp. 728 (1st Dept. 1929) ; id. 138 Misc. 512, 240 N. Y. Supp.
797; Allied Window & House Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. Palmerie, 229 App.
Div. 854, 243 N. Y. Supp. 848 (1st Dept. 1930).
"Supra note 26.
NOTES AND COMMENT
ruin. 0 Very few strikes or boycotts are used against a group of
employers simultaneously; the practice is to concentrate upon one at
a time and the general strike in industry is a rarity. But courts have
been prone to anathematize every labor boycott they disapproved of
as one aimed at injury to another rather than an aid to themselves.
And this despite the fact that the unions would lose a primary func-
tion if they destroyed the employers who give their members work.
Grant injunctions if you will, but let this fiction die.
Judicial examination of society every score of years or so, would
lead to more understanding decisions. Just as formerly many courts
could not imagine the existence of beneficial and legal trade unions,
so today they forget the conflict between employees who are attempt-
ing to get the most for their services and their masters who wish to
give the least.51 Neither side is very scrupulous about its weapons.
The masters use the blacklist, the lockout, and boycott against workers
and those who aid them, and by way of advertising control of news-
papers the suppression and exaggeration of news.52  The workers
have their few ineffectual publications (only recently showing some
strength), the strike and the boycott. Though the strike is speedier
and more direct than the boycott, it hurts the workers economically
and psychologically-for they must quit their jobs. The boycott is
slow, requires careful planning and often great expense-but some-
times it is the only practical plan, either because the employer is too
strong, or the men in the shop anti-union or indifferent, In such
case we have this appeal to the public.53 As Justice Brandeis points
out, the common law of New York declares the right of industrial
rOBut in Bossert v. Dhuy, though the Appellate Division drew the same
conclusion from the concentration of union activities, the Court of Appeals
discovered a different aim.
'Vegelahn v. Guntner, supra note 20, at 108.
I LAIDLER, supra note 9, at 36, 39 (blacklist and employers' boycott);
N. Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1934, p. 1 (lockout); VILLARD, 0. G., SOME NEws-
PAPERS AND NEWSPAPER MEr (1923) 102, 103, 107, 108, 164, 165 (advertising
control); 2 COMMONS AND ASSOCIATmS, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE U. S.
(1926) 64, 195; Hoxm, TRADE UNIONISM IN THE U. S. (1928) 236, 237(blacklist) and at 188 et seq. (employers' associations) ; cf. 2 INT. JUR. ASS'N
BuLL (Jan., 1934) No. 8, at 7 and 8 (labor injunctions by employers' asso-
ciations).
In Julie Baking Co., Inc. v. Graymond, Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, Pt. I,
Bronx Co., N. Y. L. J., Aug. 17, 1934, Mr. Justice Hofstadter recognized the
right of consumers to picket: "The right of an individual or group of individ-
uals to protest in a peaceful manner against injustice or oppression, actual or
merely fancied, is one to be cherished and not to be proscribed in any well
ordered society. * * *"; cf. Bernstein v. Retail Cleaners' and Tailors' Ass'n,
31 Ohio Nisi Prius 438, where a tailors' association was permitted to picket
the store of a cut-rate tailor.
Note that the position of plaintiff in Nann v. Raimist, supra note 6, is
analogous to that of plaintiff in instant case: each has something to sell to the
bakeries picketed-one labor, the other bread; each suffers financial loss and
each claims protection of "property rights." That one plaintiff is a manufac-
turer and the other a labor union should not change principles of equity; yet
the decisions are contradictory.
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combatants to, push their struggle to the limits of self interest.5 4
And continually, the great financial loss is shown.5 5 Free competi-
tion is not limited to struggles between persons of the same class
for the same end, 56 and unfortunate though it may seem, employers
and their employees have a right to fight; where equal rights clash,




Michael Alex was arrested at 11:00 P. M., June 15, 1931, sus-
pected of the murder of a Queens groceryman. He was arraigned
at about 11:00 A. M., June 17, 1931. In the interval of 36 hours,
during which time he was held incommunicado at the police station,
Alex confessed that he was implicated in the murder.
The defendant was tried in the Queens County Court on April
8, 1932. Although the prosecution presented a case containing vari-
ous points, there was very little evidence to connect Michael Alex
with the crime, excepting his confession to the police, which was, of
course, offered in evidence. On the trial the defendant claimed that
the confession was not voluntary because the police had beaten it
out of him, and he s6ught to introduce evidence to that effect. This
'Supria note 12, at 448. Justice Holmes in (1894) 8 HARV. L. REv. 1,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) states a principle since then followed in many
cases: that the intentional infliction of temporal damage is actionable unless
some ground of justification is shown, this justification being dependent upon
considerations of policy and of social advantage (Vegelahn v. Guntner). This,
of course, would put the burden upon the boycotter to show a reason acceptable
to the "social temperament" of the judges. A better approach seems to be
suggested in Ware & De Freville, Ltd. v. Motor Trade Ass'n (spra note 34) :
that causing damage to another raises no presumption of unlawfulness and
plaintiff must show that a right or duty has been violated. See INT. JUR.
Ass'N BULL., Vol. 3, No. 3 (Aug., 1934) at 1 et seq.
' Supra note 6.
' Vegelahn v. Guntner, supra. note 20, at 197.
' Gill v. Doerr, sitpra note 15. The peculiar light in which labor cases are
seen, even today, will be more evident when the following question is consid-
ered: What judge would have issued an injunction to a storekeeper in 1765
when the Sons of Liberty boycotted merchants selling English goods; or
against the American Federation of Catholic Societies when in 1911 it threat-
ened theatre managers who contemplated giving proscribed performances; or
against the United States government for refusing to accept the bids of a
dealer of Ford cars-thereby depriving Mr. Ford of his property (prospective
business) without due process of law? The labor boycott is no more illegal
or less potent than these were-what would be unthinkable in those cases is
present in the field of labor law because the judiciary is in the habit of granting
injunctions. Yet, where is the distinction?
